Archive for the ‘Economics’ Category

The economics of a fair game are intuitive. Even very young children understand the rules. In aggregate the participants get out of the game the resources they put in. There is seen to be an equitable arrangement between participants.

Adult bargaining games designed to test understanding of fairness, reciprocity and altruism can be helpful to clarify our understandings of these concepts. Two of these games are the ultimatum game and the dictator game.

Ultimatum game: In this game there are two players, a proposer and a responder. The proposer offers any amount of a given total stake to the responder and the proposer keeps the remainder of the stake. If the amount is accepted, both receive the agreed upon amount. If rejected, neither player receives anything.

In this game participants have to consider the concepts of reciprocity and fairness.

Dictator Game: In the Dictator Game, the responder must accept any offer by the proposer. The proposer’s stake remains constant so they don’t have to give anything to the responder.

In this game altruism motivates the proposer to give.

Game results are consistent across western cultures. In the ultimatum game, proposers offer, on average, 40% of the stake. They usually keep 60%. Offers of less than 20% are rejected half the time.

In the dictator game, an average offer is 20% of the stake, though the proposer has nothing at risk and is offering more than is necessary.

These results support the idea that people are perhaps genetically wired to be co-operative. They will also exhibit altruistic tendencies when there is no cost to them. The results also show that children have an innate propensity for fairness, reciprocity and altruism. There is a tendency for these traits to moderate as we age, perhaps from learned behaviours. In general these studies paint a positive view of basic human wiring. We expect and tend to benefit from a fair game.

Several studies are available on these games, both for adults and children. For a good review see A fair Game: Intuitive economics of Resource Exchange in four-year olds, Lucas, Wagner, Chow. Journal of Social, Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology www.jsec.com – 2(3):74-88.

A review of the US monetary System – Suppliers, Dealers and Users

As Children, we should all be taught to aspire to own a commercial bank (dealer). Dealers have a very interesting and sustainable business model. Essentially, they lend money they don’t have, which creates money in the hands of the borrower. This “miracle of capitalism” is created by the fractional reserve system of the Federal Reserve. The interest paid on these loans is earnings for the commercial bank. The leverage to assets is big; the Fed requires a 10 percent reserve so that a commercial bank can loan up to ten times its asset base.

In the US, commercial banks and investment banks were divided by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.  After the depression is was thought that risky investment banking activities needed to be separate from the Fed-backed activities of commercial banks. Glass-Steagall also introduced deposit insurance on deposits (FDIC), further protecting the interests of depositors. The act (not FDIC) was repealed in 1999 in an effort to allow US dealers to compete on a level field with Great Britain. Margaret Thatcher’s “big bang” deregulated the UK financial system in 1986. Canada followed in the late 1980s and dissolved the restrictions for commercial and investment bank mergers. Trust companies were also deregulated. Insurance companies maintained some of their independence though Canada’s big 6 retail banks are finding ways to capture market share in the insurance business as well.

Given the extremely low cost of capital and advantaged position banks share with respect to the Fed, it is difficult to compete with dealers as a group.

The promise of Big Bang and deregulation was reduced cost of capital for customers. In addition, reduction of regulatory involvement was seen as a method of increasing competition and innovation by combining access to debt and equity capabilities. Stanley Hartt, deputy Minister of Finance for Canada 1985-88 summarizes the view at that time as “the banks felt they had to grow to survive”.

These conclusions have been greatly challenged by the financial crises of 2008-09.  Leading up to the Fall of 2008, one stop financial supermarkets were able to securitize debt, selling it off to institutional investors to raise additional cash assets. This in turn allowed for more leverage to earnings and more risk assumed. The system was clearly out of equilibrium. In September 2008, perhaps precipitated by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the system froze. Banks would no longer lend to one another for fear of undisclosed liabilities (non-visibility) reducing the real credit worthiness of the borrowing parties and increasing the likelihood of default.

Big isn’t better, and in some cases as we have recently experienced, it is much worse. Canadian banks have faired better than most. A major contributing factor is that they didn’t get their wish about eliminating foreign ownership restrictions.  Canadian banks are limited to 10% foreign ownership. It seems to me that as a group they should be grateful for the failure in their lobby effort to have that restriction eliminated. It saved their asset base and our banks and protected them from much more of the downside of the credit crises of 2008-09. Instead, in 2009 the Canadian economy and financial system has experienced strong relative growth compared to the international competition.

Commercial banks are too big to fail because of the unique arrangement they have with taxpayers. FDIC (CDIC in Canada) insures assets to 250k (100k). If they default, the government, backed by tax revenues, guarantees the liability. This call on tax dollars creates an incentive to accept more risk, in an effort to maximize shareholder profit, since Banks are credited with the positive return to risk but are insured for losses.

For banks it is very unlikely if not impossible to reorganize under bankruptcy protection. Unlike other corporations like airlines, for banks bankruptcy is equal to liquidation.

Clearly there is something wrong with this system. The old idea of building scale to eliminate the competition appears to be in conflict with the best interests of the economy as a whole.

We could try to use a 1930s solution and disentangle commercial banks and investment banks or perhaps more realistically, the consequences of bank failures could be minimized. To my thinking the latter approach is more likely. New regulation can be introduced to reduce potential claims on taxpayers.

A group has been formed to provide recommendations on just that line of thinking. The Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation is a group comprised of 15 leading academics who want to bring the system back into equilibrium. The thinking is that if the incentives of scale are reduced and the costs to society of banks failures are minimized, then a better equilibrium will be established for the financial system and by extension, the economy as a whole. The group had developed several practical solutions to improve the systemic problems. It appears the US administration is listening.

Forgive me; it has been six months since my last confession…oops I mean posting.

Since April all major investment markets have rallied. This is true of both stock and bond markets. Much of the rally is due to the coordinated policies of central bankers, especially the US Federal Reserve. Toxic assets (TARP, TALF) were purchased from commercial banks and insurance companies dramatically reducing risks, visible and hidden, of commercial bank asset bases. The twin policies of de-risking and improving disclosure provided the needed incentive for those investors looking for a reason to buy.  A return to risks assumed has been re-established across the globe. Few would argue with the assessment that these efforts have resulted in the desired policy outcome of bringing order and stability to a global financial system that was unable to function in the last half of 2008.

The mandate of the Federal Reserve Bank is to use monetary policy to promote “maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long term interest rates.” Money supply is the major lever the Federal Reserve has to control the negative effects of inflation. This past year saw a unique policy response by the Fed. The unorthodox monetary policy that ensued presents many challenges today and especially in the future timing of unwinding the current position. The question remains: Will high levels of inflation result from the measures implemented by the Federal Reserve in 2008-09?

Money is created by the Fed in two ways: directly and indirectly. In the direct route, the government can print it or mint it. This is sometimes referred to as central bank money and includes net money assets of the government. This money is backed by market confidence in the ability of the issuer to meet its obligation through future tax revenues.

The indirect method is creating money through a fractional reserves system. The Federal Reserve controls the reserve of capital commercial banks are required to maintain in their operation. Today, Commercial Banks must deposit 10% of their assets in a reserve account with the Fed. From the perspective of the commercial lender, they can lend up to 10 times their asset base. This leverage creates money in the economy. This is commercial bank money also known as check book money.

Money supply has several definitions. For our purposes I will define Money supply as MB or monetary base which includes currency in circulation and demand deposits, minimum reserves and excess reserves held by the central bank.

The Fed enters into open market operations buying and selling t-bills, notes and bonds to principal dealers. The effect of a sale of bills or notes is to reduce the money supply by retiring money back to the fed. Alternatively, the when the Fed buys notes (or other assets) money supply increases. These operations also reduce or increase the leverage available further affecting the overall money supply.

Prior to October of 2008, increases in bank reserves ended up as currency in circulation. However in the fall of 2008 the fed began paying interest on excess reserves providing incentive for commercial banks to leave the money on deposit and out of circulation. This rate is equal to the upper limit of the fed funds rate of 25 basis points. The result is the increase in monetary base has had little impact on currency in circulation but has resulted in a dramatic increase in the Feds excess reserves account. This account increased from about 2 billion in mid 2008 to more than 750 billion in June of 2009.

University of Chicago economist Milton Friedman and others observed a long term relationship between money supply and inflation: (The quantity theory of money)

MV = PY

Where;

M= quantity of money

V = velocity of circulation

P = price level

Y = level of output of the economy

Friedman and other monetarists pointed out that change in money supply control the level of nominal output of the economy. Furthermore, in the long run, changes in money supply determine changes in prices or inflation. For Friedman “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, in that it can be produced only in a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in output”.[1]

Inflation erodes purchasing power. This is how it affects the average family. For the US market, in the past 15 years the purchasing power of a US dollar has dropped to 67 cents. So a consumer needs fifty percent more dollars to buy the same basket of goods. Consumer Price Index (CPI) is the common measure of inflation along with the Core CPI which excludes the prices of food and energy. In the past 50 years the average annual change in CPI has been 4.2%, 4.1% for Core CPI. There has been a big range of values for CPI; greater than 14% in 1980 and -1.2% in June of 2009 (deflation). The Fed is believed to have a target for inflation of 2%. The Bank of Canada has an explicit target of 1-3% for Core CPI.

In July of 2008, prior to the default by Lehman Brothers in October of that year, US inflation levels were relatively high at 5.4%. US money supply was about 850 billion and had been stable at that level for several quarters. By June of 2009 CPI was -1.2% and money supply had doubled to more than 1.6 trillion dollars. In addition, through large scale purchases of agency debt and mortgage backed securities, the Federal Reserves assets base increased from about 900 billion to more than 2 trillion, though this was done in such a way as to avoid increasing money supply. The Federal Reserve funded the purchase of toxic assets through a special t-bill issued by the US Treasury. The deposit accounts of the Treasury are not part of the monetary base.

The challenge for the Federal Reserve is to shrink their balance sheet and reduce the money supply before inflationary expectations rise above their target. Moving too early will delay the economic recovery. Waiting too long will result in inflation. The incentives line up behind waiting too long.

Paying interest on reserves is a temporary solution. In the long run it adds to the monetary base. As well, commercial banks will find more profitable alternatives for the money. This is a big problem. 750 billion in the hands of commercial banks can result in as much as 7 trillion in additions to the money base.

Some options for the Fed to curb future inflation – exit strategy

1. The fed could use its powers to limit the leverage for commercial banks.

2. They can enter into reverse repurchase agreements (REPO) with commercial banks for the toxic assets on the feds balance sheet. If commercial banks enter into these agreements the monetary base will decrease through a reduction in the excess reserves account.

3. Treasury could issue debt and deposit the proceeds with the Fed.

4. Fed could issue its own debt directly reducing the monetary base, in competition with the Treasury.

5. Fed could let assets mature, or sell them into the markets.

Finally, the fed must be able to conduct monetary policy independent of political pressure. To avoid inflation there must be a shift from propping up credit institutions to one of price stability and oh yes they must get the timing very right.

We should probably get ready for inflation.

Milton Freidman, “The Counter—Revolution in Monetary theory,” Wincott Memorial Lecture, Institute for Economic Affairs, London, 1970.

We are learning more about the US Feds efforts to improve securitized mortgage markets. Specifically, the legacy loans program and the legacy securities program are designed to entice private investment involvement in turning around the credit crises. There is a good review of the Toxic-asset proposal in today’s Wall Street Journal.

The incentives have to be generous enough so as to attract private investors but not so generous that a risk free return is funded by tax dollars to the benefit of private interests. So what is a reasonable return for assuming this risk? How will these prices be established?  The public purse will be best served by a wide and broad market with many participants. Some will get better deals than others but on average many participants will serve to get the prices right and move the market to an equilibrium position, balancing risk assumed and return yielded. If we end up with a closed shop -where access is limited to a few players, then the likelihood of a subsidy from taxpayers to a small number of market dominant players is enhanced.  PIMCO spokesman Bill Gross has already voiced his firm’s intention to support the program.

Joint ventures between government and private investors are complex and rightly the subject of increased scrutiny by all interested parties. If you are a tax payer then you are a stakeholder. There is a big cost to focusing on limiting return through regulation.  There have been a series of announcements from AIG that executives will return some bonuses. These relatively small victories act as a dis-incentive to those that are considering participation. There is a view that so called excessive future gains may be clawed back by government after the fact. Increased perceived risk (regulation) will require an offsetting increased future return.

In my view, well executed programs will result from a large number of independent private interests bidding for these assets. More participants results in better asset pricing. Better asset pricing will reduce the likelihood of subsidies to private interests from taxpayers.  It is in all of our interest that the program become accessible to all parties willing and able to assume the risk. We need many participants and we should encourage bidders. We have had enough focus on punishing executives and managers of financial firms. It will not help to discourage their participation. We need to get past the need to find and punish the  parties responsible for this mess and instead focus on the task at hand. Increased effort to identify and pursue manager bonuses is an unnecessary additional cost to the bailout.

Well as the above math indicates, the markets have improved so now they are  fully half of what they once were.

There are so many opinions/recipes/predictions for fixing the financial system:

Do Mark to Market assets on company balance sheets to improve visibility and certainty about earnings; or

Don’t mark to market assets as these add to volatility in earnings and in the end are estimates only

Buy equities, the recession is ending in 2009; or

Do nothing, the recession is deeper than expected and mid 2010 is the earliest relief point

Since the public purse is bailing out AIG (Citigroup, Bank America…) the new owners should protect us by reneging on employee bonuses. The principle is one of fairness to those who are preventing these companies from disappearing entirely; or

Pay the bonuses, keeping the companies whole will pay off in the future as a more valuable asset is sold. These bonuses represent insignificant dollar values

New expanded monetary policy is helpful in the short term and disastrous later; or

The US economy is expected to drive world recovery, the reasonable  cost of this effort is more US dollars in circulation

I expect many of you find all of these conflicting views compelling even as they are source of argument. I  usually find both sides of the noise plausible and somewhat meaningless as a result. The loudest opinion is unlikely to be the most helpful, or best considered. In times as these, we need to have some reasonable basis for  making investment decisions.

There seems to be a quest to define the moment of inertia, when the economy begins to grow instead of shrink.  If we could guess the day what would we do exactly? Search for a new job… buy an investment property? Maybe we could pick that exact moment to buy stocks in our retirement accounts.

Unfortunately,  we would probably be late to the party for stock markets.   If we look at the most severe recessions in the past 40 years for Japan, UK, US and Germany at the official end of each recession the local stock market had rebounded from a low of 31% in US markets in March of 1975 to a high of 137% in the UK in December of 1975. Of course the end of recessions are defined by looking back 6 months. Not helpful if you are trying to time a stock entry point or major purchase.

Good judgement starts with clearly understanding your unique situation. Investment activities should be added to after accounting for and funding cash requirements and perhaps reducing debt. In this way you will not be forced to turn what should be a positive into a negative investment experience.

The term ‘credit crisis’ seems to imply that we can expect a resumption to normal market conditions, and economic growth, as a direct result of increased lending by banks…maybe, but things haven’t worked out that way before.

Much of the recession fighting efforts by central bankers and global political administrations is focused on a forced expansion of credit. In 2007-2008, a ceasing of credit markets was crippling to economic activity. De-leveraging of global markets resulted in a sharp reduction in economic output and a pervasive global recession. The reaction by central bankers was to create conditions where bank-to-bank lending was possible again. To a great extent, and at incredible expense,  this has been accomplished. Indeed in the past few weeks we have seen credit market spreads expand. A positive indicator, since banks are probably using their own capital to lend to clients rather than simply passing on the fire hose of cash flow from the Fed.

While resumption of a normalized credit market is a precondition to ending this recession, the evidence suggests that credit expands only after the economy has rebounded. The effect is to further fuel an already expanding economy. In every recession since 1960 real bank credit didn’t peak until several quarters after the end of each recession. While this time may be different, it is likely that the same economic principles apply today as they have the past 50 years. Banks typically tighten credit as a result of loan losses. This is a reasonable response to limit losses and participate less to the downside of an economic cycle. These normal incentives operate to limit the expansion of credit prior to some clear evidence of economic expansion. When the economy begins to expand lenders expand their efforts to capture the growing market shares. It is unlikely that policy makers will be able to engineer conditions where lenders will lead a meaningful expansion in the economy. At some point incentives should switch in favour of the consumer and creating conditions for expanded demand to replace liquidity concerns as the primary focus of economic leaders.

Here is  a related short essay by Kevin Kliessen, Economist with the  Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis  http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/mt/20090301/cover.pdf

Today’s  Opening Value

We posted new lows last week and the S&P 500 is priced at less than half of the value in November 2007.  The recent investment experience has been brutal. Last week was one of the worst in terms of stock market performance that we have seen in the past couple of years and just about everyone is looking for the misery to continue.

Last Thursday Bank of Montreal economist Douglas Porter, suggested the worst was over and we should begin to consider the prospects of a better economy by the end of 2009. His opinion wasn’t appreciated by those that offered comment. Practically no one agreed with his point of view. The average opinion was outright critical and many dismissed his thoughts as someone who is shilling for a bank, his opinion therefore bought and paid for. I don’t know Douglas Porter other than by his reputation as a good economist.  I do have some respect for his decision to release information to the hostile crowd. He was, I think,  aware of the probable feedback. So what is going on here? Is everyone so sure that they know the future will be a continuation of the recent past? Is Porter simply rolling the dice with other people’s money (risk) to generate profit for his bank? It seems to me that investors understand there is higher risk in the investment markets. Their recent experience is bad and they look for this to continue. The idea that economists or financial analysts can predict the bottom for investment markets is a source of irritation bordering on anger.

For the sake of clarity here are some basic financial principles in which we can rely:

• Higher return comes with higher risk. The risk premium or compensation for risk is higher when things are not going well.
• Investment decisions should be made on a forward-looking basis not by looking at the recent past as prologue.
• It is improbable to predict or time the turn in the investment markets.
• Short term returns from a trough, or market low,  is very high.
• Selling after a significant drop in prices means you will probably give up significant short term return when the market recovers.
• Some short term traders will correctly predict the turn in the market but only by chance.

All good and bad things come to an end. This financial crisis will as well. So to track the progress we have to first define the beginning. My metric is the last high of the market as defined by the S&P 500.  So the bear market began October 9, 2007 closing at 1565. A bear market is commonly defined as a 20 percent decline in the index. This is the 7th bear market of the past 40 years and by measure of decline the only S&P 500 drop to exceed 50%.  The lowest point was 741 on November 21, 2008, a 52% decline. Today we are down 47% from the 2007 high. Stock prices are immediate measures and are often referred to as leading indicators or predictors of where the economy might be going.

This bear market began as a financial problem and is now a full blown world wide recession. A recession is 2 consecutive quarters of negative real GDP. Recessions are backward looking measures as it takes time to collect the data.  This predictive ability comes with a degree of error as many more recessions have been predicted by the market than have come to pass.

The U.S. recession officially began in December 2007. The  National Bureau of Economic Research publishes some good data on past recessions. Peak to trough since the Second World War, the average recession has lasted 10 months. The range is large however: the longest peak to trough was experienced through the U.S. Civil War at 65 months. In the 1930s the duration was 43 months.  Unfortunately, there isn’t enough computing power in the world to confidently predict the end of a recession. The economy is simply too complex.

I think the stock markets will rebound. Optimism has always won in the end. The S&P 500 first hit 100 in 1968. Today, we worry as the Index has fallen below 900. This isn’t gravity, it’s a measure of growth in the economy. The economy is larger, the population has grown, companies make  more money, and these fundamentals are eventually reflected in the value of the index.

In future posts I will continue to review the evidence to try to determine when the uphill swing begins. Stay tuned…

I recently finished reading Outliers by Malcolm Gladwell. This current best seller is written by author of The Tipping Point and Blink. It’s a short read that is, in my opinion, worth the effort.  The central theme is success . Outliers, for the purposes of this book, are people who have achieved exceptional results in their professional pursuits compared to those who have perhaps underperformed.   There were a couple of notions that I found especially useful.  Gladwell claims that there is plenty of evidence suggesting that it takes 10,000 hours to master a profession. Based on a 2000 work year that adds up to about 5 years. He looks to the life works of masters like Mozart and Gates to demonstrate this time line. He concludes that intelligence, to a degree, plays a roll in the success, in that a minimum standard is required.  More importantly, demographics, timing and perhaps luck are the key contributors.

There is a Darwinian notion here for me. Outcomes are, to an extent, predetermined. Outliers appear continually and their impassioned exploits are rejected or rewarded based on things that are largely out of their control.  Demographics,  perhaps like natural selection, decide the timing for these mutations.  Gladwell concludes that the individual player has less to do with the outcome than we might give credit for… so I think I’ll wait for the unifying theory.

These notions can be considered when looking at our new generation of leaders.  The Jones Generation refers to that portion of the  population born between 1955 and 1964. They are the lost generation, sandwiched between Boomers and Gen Xs. President Obama and Prime Minister Harper are part of Gen Jones.  This generation had the shared experience of starting their careers in the recession of the early eighties. There  is a certain shared frustration as a result of  high expectations for success meeting 20% interest rates.  The view is that their older boomer brothers and sisters had an easier road.  Apparently, once they did manage to get a toehold on careers and families, the Joneses turned into perhaps  the greatest consumer generation of all time. It seems that as leaders the Joneses should remember some of the lessons of the early eighties. Tough times require a willingness to compete. Perhaps 10,000 hours working through a previous recession will serve as great training for this current group of leaders to succeed in the task at hand.

The financial press appears to be drawing parallels between our current financial challenges and the depression of the 1930s. To some it may seem reasonable. Yesterday, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, in the House of commons, referred to the economic environment as a depression, though he later explained that he simply got the words wrong meaning to say recession. This is how rumours start.

While drawing parallels may make it easier to explain complex subject matter, there are many differences between now and then.

1. In the 1930s there was no social security. Today these cheques, delivered monthly, provide a basic level of subsistence.

2.  Peoples’ savings are protected from bank failures through federal deposit insurance. In the 30s investors lost their savings when banks defaulted.

3. Governments around the globe have lowered interest rates in response to a weak economy. In the 30s the U.S. actually raised rates simply getting the monetary policy wrong. These rate cuts are significant. The Bank of England is currently at 1% for fed funds, the lowest level since the Bank was established in the the 1700s . Japan has lowered the rate to zero. Canada and the U.S. are at 1%.

4. There has been a global increase in money supply unlike the contraction experienced in the 30s.

5. International trade agreements now promote trade between economies. The escalating trade barriers introduced in the thirties had the opposite effect.

6. As a global trend, corporate and individual taxes are low when compared to the rising tax environment which typified the 1930s.

7. We now have single digit unemployment. In the thirties unemployment exceeded 20% in North America.

8. Governments have acted quickly, introducing a fiscal stimulus package in a globally co-ordinated effort. In the 30s Roosevelt’s “New Deal”  took several years to launch.

9. We have the experience of the depression as our guide.

For a great read and perspective of economic cycles I recommend The Ascent of Money by British Historian  Niall Ferguson. It it densely written, and therefore a moderately difficult read but gives an excellent review of how governments have dealt with crises beginning with the advent of money.