A review of the US monetary System – Suppliers, Dealers and Users

As Children, we should all be taught to aspire to own a commercial bank (dealer). Dealers have a very interesting and sustainable business model. Essentially, they lend money they don’t have, which creates money in the hands of the borrower. This “miracle of capitalism” is created by the fractional reserve system of the Federal Reserve. The interest paid on these loans is earnings for the commercial bank. The leverage to assets is big; the Fed requires a 10 percent reserve so that a commercial bank can loan up to ten times its asset base.

In the US, commercial banks and investment banks were divided by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.  After the depression is was thought that risky investment banking activities needed to be separate from the Fed-backed activities of commercial banks. Glass-Steagall also introduced deposit insurance on deposits (FDIC), further protecting the interests of depositors. The act (not FDIC) was repealed in 1999 in an effort to allow US dealers to compete on a level field with Great Britain. Margaret Thatcher’s “big bang” deregulated the UK financial system in 1986. Canada followed in the late 1980s and dissolved the restrictions for commercial and investment bank mergers. Trust companies were also deregulated. Insurance companies maintained some of their independence though Canada’s big 6 retail banks are finding ways to capture market share in the insurance business as well.

Given the extremely low cost of capital and advantaged position banks share with respect to the Fed, it is difficult to compete with dealers as a group.

The promise of Big Bang and deregulation was reduced cost of capital for customers. In addition, reduction of regulatory involvement was seen as a method of increasing competition and innovation by combining access to debt and equity capabilities. Stanley Hartt, deputy Minister of Finance for Canada 1985-88 summarizes the view at that time as “the banks felt they had to grow to survive”.

These conclusions have been greatly challenged by the financial crises of 2008-09.  Leading up to the Fall of 2008, one stop financial supermarkets were able to securitize debt, selling it off to institutional investors to raise additional cash assets. This in turn allowed for more leverage to earnings and more risk assumed. The system was clearly out of equilibrium. In September 2008, perhaps precipitated by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the system froze. Banks would no longer lend to one another for fear of undisclosed liabilities (non-visibility) reducing the real credit worthiness of the borrowing parties and increasing the likelihood of default.

Big isn’t better, and in some cases as we have recently experienced, it is much worse. Canadian banks have faired better than most. A major contributing factor is that they didn’t get their wish about eliminating foreign ownership restrictions.  Canadian banks are limited to 10% foreign ownership. It seems to me that as a group they should be grateful for the failure in their lobby effort to have that restriction eliminated. It saved their asset base and our banks and protected them from much more of the downside of the credit crises of 2008-09. Instead, in 2009 the Canadian economy and financial system has experienced strong relative growth compared to the international competition.

Commercial banks are too big to fail because of the unique arrangement they have with taxpayers. FDIC (CDIC in Canada) insures assets to 250k (100k). If they default, the government, backed by tax revenues, guarantees the liability. This call on tax dollars creates an incentive to accept more risk, in an effort to maximize shareholder profit, since Banks are credited with the positive return to risk but are insured for losses.

For banks it is very unlikely if not impossible to reorganize under bankruptcy protection. Unlike other corporations like airlines, for banks bankruptcy is equal to liquidation.

Clearly there is something wrong with this system. The old idea of building scale to eliminate the competition appears to be in conflict with the best interests of the economy as a whole.

We could try to use a 1930s solution and disentangle commercial banks and investment banks or perhaps more realistically, the consequences of bank failures could be minimized. To my thinking the latter approach is more likely. New regulation can be introduced to reduce potential claims on taxpayers.

A group has been formed to provide recommendations on just that line of thinking. The Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation is a group comprised of 15 leading academics who want to bring the system back into equilibrium. The thinking is that if the incentives of scale are reduced and the costs to society of banks failures are minimized, then a better equilibrium will be established for the financial system and by extension, the economy as a whole. The group had developed several practical solutions to improve the systemic problems. It appears the US administration is listening.